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Product Boundary, vertical Competition, and the
double Mark-up problem
Leonard K.Cheng*
and
Jae Nahm**

We develop a model in which a main product (called product A) provides a performance quality z
by itself, whereas a complementary product (called product B) is useless by itself but enhances
the main product’s performance quality to q >z. This asymmetric complementarity gives rise to
the following results. First, if z is relatively small, then firms A and B behave as if the products
are symmetrically complementary with the usual double marginalization problem. Second, if z is
sufficiently large, then firms A and B price their products as if they are independent. Third, over
a certain range of intermediate z, no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists.

1.

Introduction
In the computing industry, since 1990 there has been no single dominant vertically

integrated firm. Instead, the industry is characterized by vertical disintegration i.e., computer
systems or platforms consist of many vertically related layers of components. Firms in different
layers rely on one another, but at the same time they compete against each other for a bigger
share of the industry profits. It is important to understand complementarity among different
components.
In 1838, Cournot analysed the pricing of symmetrically complementary products, like left
and right shoes, and identified the well known “double mark-up problem,” i.e., when the two
complementary products are supplied by two independent monopolies, the prices are higher than
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Product Boundary
those set by an integrated monopoly. However, the complementarity relationship in the
computing industry is quite different from that analysed by Cournot and others. For instance, an
advanced application program enhances the value of an operating system (O/S), but it is useless
without the O/S. In contrast, the O/S provides its basic functions without the advanced
application program.
Furthermore, as Bresnahan (1999) and Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) point out, in
order to obtain a larger share of industry profits, a firm producing one product has an incentive to
enter the others’ “turf” by incorporating functions provided by the other firms. For example, in its
early days, MS Windows did not include program functions such as WordPad, Internet Explorer
(I.E.), and Windows Media, but over time it has included these and other programs that were
previously supplied by independent firms. Another example is secondary cache. Once a separate
piece of hardware, secondary cache is now integrated into the Intel CPU. As firms constantly try
to expand their product boundaries, the boundaries between adjacent layers and the relationships
among those products change continuously as a consequence of both vertical competition and
technological innovation.
This paper analyses the strategic interactions between two firms whose products are
asymmetrically complementary and attempts to shed light on vertical competition among
different layers of the computing industry by exploring the effects of changes in their product
boundaries.
To model asymmetric complementarity, we assume that the “main product” A, produced
by firm A, by itself provides a performance quality of z, but consumers may derive a higher
performance quality of q ( i.e., q > z ) by combining it with an “enhancer” product B, produced
independently by firm B. Unlike the main product A, product B does not provide any function by
itself.
To explore the implications of asymmetric complementarities between products A and B,
we first analyse a simultaneous pricing game between firms A and B given z, 0< z <q. It turns out
that asymmetric complementarity combined with heterogeneous consumer preference over
performance gives rise to the following three unexpected results. First, if z is relatively small,
then products A and B are as if they are symmetrically complementary with z = 0 and are always
sold as a bundle. Second, if z is sufficiently large, then firms A and B price their products as if
they are independent, in which case some consumers buy A alone while others buy both products.
This result has an implication on the “double mark-up” problem: Even though products A and B
are asymmetrically complementary, the firms set their prices independently, and the “double
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mark-up” problem vanishes. Third, over a certain range of intermediate value z, no pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium exists. However, we can construct a mixed strategy equilibrium over the range.
Also, we examine the effects of increasing z, which can be interpreted as an expansion of
firm A’s product boundary. We analyse how an increase in z affects social welfare, industry
profits and consumer welfare.
There are several recent related studies on complementary technologies and patents (e.g.,
Farrell and Katz 2000 and Lerner and Tirole 2002) and tying/bundling (e.g., Whinston (1990),
Choi and Stefanadis (2001), Carlton and Waldman (2002), and Nalebuff (2004)).
Farrell and Katz (2000) analyze the incentive of a monopolist in product A to enter
complementary product B’s market in order to force independent suppliers of B to charge lower
prices, which increases its own profits made from product A. If consumers in our model were
homogeneous, then our results would become very similar to those of Farrell and Katz (2000): an
increase in z "price squeezes" product B and always has a positive effects on firm A’s profits.
With heterogeneous consumer preference, however, we show that an increase in z does not have
monotonic effects on firms’ pricing and profits.
Our model is also closely related to Lerner and Tirole (2004)’s model of patent portfolios,
which allows a full range of complementarity and substitutability. There are several major
differences between our model and theirs. First, their focus is on factors that encourage or hinder
the formation of patent pools and the welfare effect of these pools, whereas our focus is on the
firms’ switching pricing behavior and the welfare effects of changes in z. Second, in their model
all users or licensees derive the same amount of marginal benefits from an additional patent, but
in our model different consumer types derive different marginal benefits from the basic product A
and the bundle (A+B). Because of these differences, we obtain the result that the demand for A
and B is independent of each other if z is sufficiently large and that no pure-strategy equilibrium
exists for intermediate values of z.
Our paper is related to the literature on tying/bundling because product A in our model
can be regarded as a bundle of two complementary products, A1 and B1 ( i.e., A1 and B1 combine
to yield a performance quality z, whereas A1 and B combine to yield a performance quality q.)
However, this literature either focuses on the entry deterrence role of tying or assumes that tying
with a firm’s own product excludes consumption of competing products. 1 However, when

1

In the literature on tying, if an incumbent ties its products, it is often assumed that consumers

cannot untie the tied product, or consumers do not have any incentive to add an entrant’s product
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Microsoft ties its Windows O/S and its applications such as I.E., it still leaves room for
consumers to add a rival product to its OS. We capture this product relationship by assuming that
product B as an enhancer of the basic product A.
Nalebuff (2004) shows that when consumers are heterogenous in their valuations of
products A and B, an incumbent, by bundling A and B, can significantly lower the profits of a
single-product entrant and that bundling could be quite an effective entry deterrence strategy.2
However, our paper looks at the case in which one firm produces only a base product, and the
other firm produces a complementary product.
Section 2 develops a simple model, and section 3 analyzes the game and demonstrates the
possible non-existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the effect of z on
firms’ profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare. In section 5, we check the robustness of the
main results when consumers’ preferences vary along two dimensions. Concluding remarks
follow in the final section.

2.

A Model of product boundary
There are two firms, A and B, that provide complementary products A and B,

respectively. Product A provides some basic functions, and its performance level is measured by
a parameter z. Product B by itself does not provide any function, but enhances product A’s
performance. The combination of products A and B (denoted by (A+B) hereafter) provides a
higher performance level q ≥ z. Let product i’s (i=A, B) price and unit production cost be denoted
by pi and ci, respectively. We assume that the two firms set their prices simultaneously.
Given pA and pB, consumers make their purchase decisions. Consumers differ in their
valuation of product quality. The utility function of a type-θ consumer, θ∈ [0,1], is given by

θQ+I, where I is her income spent on numeraire goods, and Q is a quality index of a
product. Let the cumulative distribution function and continuous density functions be
given by G(θ) and g(θ), respectively. Define F(θ) as the proportion of consumers whose type is
higher than θ and f(θ) as F’s density function, i.e., F(θ)=1-G(θ), and f(θ)= -g(θ)<0. We make the
standard assumption that the distribution of θ satisfies the increasing hazard rate condition:
to the tied products because there is no quality difference between the incumbent and the
entrant’s products.
2

Interestingly, the bundling decision increases the incumbent’s profit even after entry occurs in

one of these markets. In Whinston (1990), and Choi and Stefanadis (2001), tying is not a
profitable choice for an incumbent if entry has already occurred.
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namely, -f(θ)/F(θ) is increasing in θ.3 This increasing hazard rate condition yields strictly quasiconcave profit functions for firms A and B.
We impose the following restrictions on the model’s key parameters throughout our
analysis,
Assumption 1: cA + cB ≤ q
0≤ z ≤ z = q - cB
The first restriction implies that the maximum willingness to pay for product (A+B) is larger than
or equal to its unit production cost. Without this restriction, (A+B) will never be supplied. The
second restriction implies that the quality enhancement brought about by product B (i.e., q-z) is
larger than or equal to cB. Without the second restriction, there will be no supply of product B.
Under Assumption 1, both firms A and B are active and the classic double mark-up problem may
arise.

Demand functions for products A and B
Consumer θ has three options: (i) to buy product A alone and gain net utility VA (θ) = zθpA; (ii) to buy (A+B) and gain net utility VA+B (θ) = qθ-pA - pB ; (iii) and to buy neither and gain
zero net utility. A necessary condition for the consumer to buy A alone is θ ≥ θA = pA/z.
Similarly, a necessary condition for a consumer to buy (A+B) is θ ≥ θA+B = (pA+ pB)/ q.
Consumers get additional benefits of (q-z) θ by purchasing product B in addition to product A.
Thus, a necessary condition for a consumer to buy B in addition to A is that θ ≥ θB= pB/(q-z).
Since VA(θ) intersects the steeper function VA+B(θ) at one point, θB, there are three
possible cases.
Case 1. Virtually Independent Products: θA < θA+B < θB.
This case is illustrated in Figure 1. Consumer types between θA and θB will buy product
A alone, whereas consumer types θ ≥ θB will buy (A+B). That is, consumers with θ ≥ θA will

3

The increasing hazard rate condition is satisfied by most widely used distributions. See

Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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buy product A, and consumers with θ ≥ θB will additionally buy product B. Substituting the
definition of θA and θB, the demand functions for A and B become:

DA(pA,pB) = F(θA) = F(

pA
z

)

(1)

p

DB(pA,pB)= F(θB) = F( q −Bz )
As long as their prices satisfy θA < θA+B < θB, the demand for A depends only on pA, and
the demand for B depends only on pB. Firms A and B act as independent firms, and we call this
case “virtually independent products” and refer to the firms’ pricing as “independent pricing” in
the rest of this paper. Let p *A1 and p B* 1 denote the Nash Equilibrium prices under independent
pricing. For example, when F(θ)=1-θ (i.e., θ is uniformly distributed), the Nash equilibrium
prices are

z+ c A
2

and

q − z + cB
2

, respectively.

Case 2: Virtually Strict Complements: θB < θA+B < θA
Figure 2 illustrates this case. Consumers with θ < θA+B will buy neither products, but
consumers with θ ≥ θA+B will buy (A+B). None will buy product A alone. Substituting the
definition of θA+B, the demand functions for A and B become:

DA(pA,pB) = DB(pA,pB) = F (

p A + pB
q

)

(2)

As long as θB < θA+B < θA, the demand for A and that for B depend on the total price (pA+ pB),
exhibiting the characteristics of strict complements. Thus, in the rest of this paper we call this
case “virtually strict complements” and refer to the firms’ pricing of the virtually strict
complements as “bundling pricing.” Let RA( pB) and RB( pA) denote the firms’ best response
functions when the two faces demand system (2). We assume that

1
RA'

> RB' so that there is a

unique interaction of the two best response functions. The Nash equilibrium is denoted by ( p *A 2
and p B* 2 ). For example, when F(θ)=1-θ, we have RA( pB)=
Nash equilibrium is (

q − cB + 2 c A
3

,

q − c A + 2 cB
3

q − pB + c A
2

, RB( pA)=

q − p A + cB
2

, and the

).
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Borderline between Virtually Strict Complements and Independent Products: θB

Case 3:

= θA+B = θA
Starting from this borderline case, the firms face demand system (1) either if firm A
lowers its price or if firm B increases its price, however slightly. And they face demand system
(2) either if firm A increases its price or if firm B lowers its price. In other words, the firms’
demand functions meet at a kink where θB = θA+B = θA. Lemma 2 in Section 3 says that the case
θB = θA+B = θA cannot be a Nash equilibrium. An immediate implication is that if a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium exists, then the realized demand system must be either (1) or (2). Therefore
( p *A1 and p B* 1 ) and ( p *A 2 and p B* 2 ) are the only candidates for a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

3.

Analysis

Firm B’s optimal pricing
We first examine firm B’s optimal price given pA. The demand function faced by firm B
depends on the relative size of θB and θA.

DB1 = F(

pB
q−z

)

if pB ≥

q−z
z

pA

if pB ≤

q− z
z

pA

DB(pA,pB ) =
DB2 = F (

p A + pB
q

)

Let us define the profit functions corresponding to DB1 and DB2 as ΠB1(pB; z) = F(
and ΠB2(pB; pA) = F (
constraint pB ≥

q− z
z

p A + pB
q

)(pB – cB)

) (pB – cB), respectively. Firm B maximizes ΠB1(pB; z) subject to the

p A and ΠB2(pB; pA) subject to the constraint pB ≤

functions intersect at pB =

pB
q−z

q−z
z

q− z
z

p A . The two profit

p A .4 Let p B* 1 and RB(pA) denote the unconstrained optimal prices

of ΠB1 and ΠB2, respectively. Lemma 1 shows that firm B’s overall profit function has a single
peak for any given pA and that its optimal price is unique.

4

When pB =

q−z
z

p A , we have

p A + pB
q

= 1q ( q −z z pB+pB)=

1
q− z

pB .
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Lemma 1: Firm B’s optimal price depends on pA and is continuous in pA. There exist p

A

and

p A , where 0 < p A < p A < q-cB , such that
p B* 1
q− z
z

*
B

p =

if pA ≤ p

pA

if p

A

A

≤ pA ≤ p A

if p A ≤ pA ≤ q - cB. 5

RB (pA)
Proof. See the Appendix.

If pA is zero, then clearly all consumers will get product A, and the only question is who
will buy product B additionally. From the point of view of firm B, it faces demand system (1)
and maximizes its profit along DB1 by setting its optimal price, p B* 1 , or equivalently by selling its
products to consumers whose types are above the cut-off point θ B* = p B* 1 /(q-z). As pA increases,
fewer consumers will buy product A, but as long as the lowest consumer type that buys product A
is lower than p B* 1 /(q-z), firm B’s optimal price remains unconstrained by pA.
However, once pA exceeds the threshold p

A

but remains below p A , then the constraint

becomes just binding, so firm B’s optimal price occurs at the kink

q− z
z

pA .

If pA is higher than p A , then no consumer is interested in buying product A alone, and
products A and B are always sold together as a bundle, so B’s optimal price becomes RB (pA).
Figure 3 illustrates how firm B’s optimal price responds to pA in the case of a uniform
distribution.6 As the figure shows, firm B’s best response is not monotonic.

Firm A’s optimal pricing
Similar to firm B’s case, firm A’s demand curve consists of two connected segments DA1
and DA2. When pB is taken as given, firm A maximizes ΠA1 = F(
but maximizes ΠA2 = F(

p A + pB
q

)(pA-cA) subject to pA ≤

z
q− z

pB,

) (pA-cA) subject to pA ≥ q −z z pB. Let p*A1 and RA(pB) denote the

5

If pA> q-cB, then p B* = cB, and none will buy product B.

6

In this case, p =
A

pA
z

z ( q − z + cB ) ,
2( q − z )

pA =

z ( q + cB ) ,
2q − z

p B* 1 = q − z + cB , and RB(pA) = q − p A + cB .
2

2
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unconstrained optimal pA for the profit functions, ΠA1 and ΠA2, respectively. The following
lemma describes firm A’s optimal price.

Lemma 2 There exist p% B such that if pB ≤ p% B , then firm A sets its price equal to RA(pB), and we
have θA* > θB*; if pB ≥ p% B , firm A sets its price at p*A1 , and we have θA* < θB*. Also, since
RA( p% B ) > p *A1 , firm A’s optimal price is not continuous in pB at pB = p% B .
Proof. See the Appendix.

While products A and B are asymmetric complements, products A and (A+B) are
substitutes for each other. Firm A chooses between two different pricing strategies: “independent
pricing” (i.e., selling product A as a stand-alone product) or “bundling pricing” (i.e., selling it as a
part of the bundle (A+B)). That is, firm A can sell its product as a stand-alone low-quality
product or can sell it as a component of a high-quality product. If pB is sufficiently low, then firm
A will find it profitable to choose bundling pricing. In contrast, if pB is relatively high, then the
demand for (A+B) is limited by the high price of product B, so firm A may find it more profitable
to choose independent pricing.
These considerations behind firm A’s optimal pricing strategies are quite similar to those
discovered by Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2003).7 In Gabszewicz and Wauthy’s model, there are
two firms supplying vertically differentiated stand-alone products, but consumers also have an
option of “joint purchase” of both products. They analyse how the joint purchase affects price
competition between duopolists under the assumption of uniform distribution and zero production
costs. They find that “a firm faces two different pricing strategies: either it charges relatively low
prices and fights for market shares or it “retreats” with high price on the “rich” side of the market
where “joint purchasers” are located.”

Nash equilibrium

7

In Gabszewicz and Wauthy’s model, products have their own stand-alone values. However, in

our model product B is useless by itself. Given this difference, in our model we have an
equilibrium in which the two firms behave as independent firms. Such an equilibrium cannot
arise in Gabszewicz and Wauthy’s model.
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Lemma 2 has an implication for finding Nash equilibria. If pB is lower than p% B , then firm
A sets its price equal to RA(pB), which is strictly larger than

z
q−z

pB , and we have θA* > θB*; If pB

is higher than p% B , firm A sets its price equal to p *A1 , which is strictly less than

z
q−z

pB , and we

have θA* < θB*. So the lemma implies that θA* = θB* cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, if a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists, then in equilibrium either both firms adopt independent
pricing (θA < θB ) or both firms adopt bundling pricing (θB < θA). From this result Corollary 1
follows.
Corollary 1. The prices ( p *A1 , p B* 1 ) and ( p *A 2 , p B* 2 ) are the only candidates for a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium. The former outcome results from both firms adopting independent pricing,
while the latter outcome results from both firms adopting bundling pricing.

An example of non-existence of pure-Strategy Nash equilibrium8
Even though firm B’s optimal price is everywhere continuous in pA, the existence of a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium cannot be guaranteed because firm A’s optimal price is not
continuous at p% B . The following simple example provides an illustration.
Assume that the production costs cA and cB are zero, q=1, and θ is uniformly distributed
between zero and one. From Corollary 1 we need to consider only ( p *A1 , p B* 1 ) and ( p *A 2 , p B* 2 ) as
candidates for a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
We first verify whether ( p *A1 , p B* 1 ), resulting from independent pricing, is a Nash
equilibrium. A necessary condition for these prices to be a Nash equilibrium is that the two firms
face demand system (1). Given this demand system and zero production costs, firm A maximizes
(1-

pA
z

p

)pA, and firm B maximizes (1- 1−Bz )pB. Firm A’s first-order condition is given by

(1-

8

pA
z

)-

pA
z

= 0,

(3)

We would like to thank an anonymous referee for providing this example and the intuition

behind it.
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and firm B’s first-order condition is given by

p

p

(1- 1−Bz ) 1−Bz = 0

(4)

The solution of the two first-order conditions (3) and (4) is given by ( p *A1 = 2z , p B* 1 = 1−2z ), which
yields θA =θB = 12 , implying that both firms target the same marginal consumer. But the
discussion leading to Corollary 1 shows that θA =θB cannot be a Nash equilibrium because firm A
has an incentive to deviate from θA = θB. A non-technical explanation is as follows.
The first-order condition (3) says that if firm A decreases (increases) its price by d, its
consumers increase (decrease) by

d
z

. However, when firm A increases its price, the impact of

this price change on firm A’s profit is different from that captured by the first order condition
(3).9 If firm A does increase its price by d, then θA > θB, and its marginal consumer is determined
by θA+B. Thus its consumers decrease by d, which is less than

d
z

as indicated by (3). That is, when

pA goes up, fewer customers walk away from product A than as indicated by (3) because some of
those who decide not to buy A alone may buy the bundle (A+B) instead. Since the decrease in the
sale of product A due to an increase in pA is less than that indicated by the first-order condition
(3), independent pricing cannot be a Nash equilibrium. As Lemma 2 indicates, it is firm A that
wants to deviate from θA=θB.
With regard to the outcome ( p *A1 , p B* 1 ), firm B’s first-order condition (4) implies that its
consumers increase by d/(1-z) if firm B decreases its price by d. It is not profitable for firm B to
decrease its price from p B* 1 when it could attract d/(1-z) additional customers by lowering its
price by d. Starting from θA =θB , if firm B lowers its price by d, then θA >θB and its marginal
consumer is determined by θA+B, implying that it will only gain d customers. Thus, attracting even

9

If firm A decreases its price, the impact on its profit is the same as indicated by (3): if firm A

does decrease its price by d, then we have θA < θB, and its marginal consumer is determined by
θA . Thus its consumers increase by

d
z

, as indicated by (3).
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fewer customers by lowering its price makes it strictly unprofitable. Thus, firm B’s optimal price
is p B* 1 = 1−2z if firm A sets p *A1 = 2z .10
Second, let us check whether bundling pricing ( p *A 2 , p B* 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium. A
necessary condition for these prices to be a Nash equilibrium is that the two firms face demand
system (2). At the candidate Nash equilibrium ( p *A 2 = 13 , p B* 2 = 13 ), each firm earns

1
9

. Since

product A provides quality level z by itself, firm A can always sell its product at least half of the
consumers by setting pA equal to

z
2

, yielding a profit of

z
4

. Thus, if z is larger than

4
9

, then the

symmetric price vector ( p *A 2 = 13 , p B* 2 = 13 ) cannot be a Nash equilibrium because firm A can do
better by switching to independent pricing ( pA =

z
2

). In contrast, for z ≤ 94 , firm A does not have

any incentive to deviate from bundling pricing to independent pricing. Since firm B does not have
any incentive to deviate from p B* 2 = 13 given p *A 2 = 13 ,11 the symmetric price vector
( p *A 2 = 13 , p B* 2 = 13 ) is a Nash equilibrium if z ≤ 94 .
In summary, if z ≤ 94 , then ( p *A 2 = 13 , p B* 2 = 13 ) is a Nash equilibrium, which is identical to
that for the case z= 0, the case of strict complements. There is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
if

4
9

<z <1.12
In this example the independent pricing cannot be a Nash equilibrium when the two firms

target the same marginal consumer. The intuition is extendable to the general cases with positive
cA and cB and general distribution function F(θ). Under the independent pricing, firm A
maximizes zF(θA)(θA-

cA
z

c

), and firm B maximizes (q-z)F(θB) (θB- q −Bz ), respectively. The firms’

optimal cut-off points θA and θB depend on

cA
z

and

cB
q− z

, respectively. When

cA
z

=

cB
q− z

,

independent pricing yields θA =θB, which cannot be a Nash equilibrium. The reason is the same:
if firm A’s marginal customer is already buying B, then a price increase by firm A will not lead to
as large a loss in customers as would be the case if firm A were acting without product B. This
10

Starting from θA =θB , if firm B raises its price by d, then θA <θB and it will lose d/(1-z)

customers as indicated by (4)
11

With regard to the outcome ( p *A 2 , p B* 2 ), a general proof of Proposition 1 shows that it is

optimal for firm B to set its price at p B* 2 if firm A chooses p *A 2 .
12

If z=1, there is a Nash equilibrium in which firm B sets its price at zero, and firm A behaves as

a single monopolist.
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gives firm A an incentive to raise its price, thus destroying independent pricing as a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium. By continuity, the same argument goes through if
cB
q− z

cA
z

is sufficiently close to

(or equivalently, if firm A’s market share is sufficiently close to firm B’s market share).

General cases
In this section we characterize pure-strategy Nash equilibria for the general cases of our
model. We will show that such equilibria exist if z is either sufficiently small or if z is sufficiently
large. However, there is an intermediate range of z within which no pure strategy equilibrium
exists, even though a mixed strategy equilibrium exists.
To understand intuitively the general non-existence result, we apply the logic used in the
above example. Consider one of the Nash equilibrium candidates under bundling pricing, ( p *A 2
and p B* 2 ). In this case firm A earns Π*A2, which are independent of z. If firm A chooses to deviate
from bundling pricing by setting its price at p *A1 , it earns at least Π*A1 = F(

p*A1
z

)( p *A1 -cA) , which

is monotonically increasing in z. Since Π*A2 is independent of z, there exists a unique zmin such
that Π*A1 > Π*A2 if and only if z>zmin Thus, if z > zmin, then firm A will choose independent pricing,
implying that ( p *A 2 and p B* 2 ) cannot be a Nash equilibrium; if z ≤zmin, then firm A would not
deviate from bundled sales, and ( p *A 2 and p B* 2 ) becomes a Nash equilibrium.
Similarly, consider the other Nash equilibrium candidate under independent pricing, ( p*A1
and pB* 1 ), in which case firm A makes Π*A1. However, if firm A switches to bundling pricing, its
optimal price is RA( pB* 1 ), and its resultant profit is T2* (z) = F(

RA ( p*B 1 ) + p*B 1
q

) (RA( pB* 1 )-cA). Let T(z)

be defined as T(z)= Π*A1(z) - T2* (z), which is continuous in z. It can be shown that T(z)>0 if z is
sufficiently large and that T(z)<0 if z is sufficiently small, which implies that, if z is large enough,
independent pricing is a Nash equilibrium and that, if z is sufficiently small, independent pricing
cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Since T(z) is continuous in z, there is at least one z such that T(z)=0.
Let the largest solution of T(z) ＝ 0 be denoted by zmax . It follows that T(z) >0 if zmax <z. That is,
for z≥ zmax, ( p*A1 and pB* 1 ) is a Nash equilibrium.
The only question left is what happens between zmin and zmax. If T(z) ＝ 0 has multiple
(always an odd number of ) solutions, then there are alternating sub-intervals over which T(z) > 0
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and sub-intervals over which T(z)<0. For instance, consider the case of three solutions.13 Let the
three solutions be given by z1, z2 and zmax. Then, as figure 4 shows, T(z)<0 for z < z1; T(z)>0 for z1
< z < z2; T(z) < 0 for z2 < z < zmax, and T(z) > 0 for z > zmax. It implies that for zmin< z < z1 there
is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; for z1 < z < z2, independent pricing is a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium; for z2 < z< zmax there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; for z > zmax,
independent pricing is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
If T(z) ＝ 0 has only one solution, then the unique solution is zmax, and T(z)<0 for the
interval ( zmin , zmax), indicating that a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist over the entire
interval. A sufficient condition for the uniqueness is that T(z) monotonically increases in z. Since
*

T(z)= Π*A1(z) - T2 (z), by the envelop theorem, we have

∂T ( z )
∂z

=

∂Π*A1
∂z

*

A2
− ∂Π
∂p*
B1

∂p*B 1
∂z

. If the direct effect

of z on Π*A1 is larger than the effect of z on Π*A2 through pB* 1 , then T(z) is monotonically
increasing in z and T(z)=0 has a unique solution.14
For those intervals over which no pure-strategy equilibrium exists, we can construct a
mixed-strategy equilibrium. The following proposition characterizes Nash equilibrium for
different values of z.
Proposition 1: There exist two unique critical values of z: zmin, zmax, with 0 < zmin< zmax ≤ q-cB
such that the following holds:
(a) If z ≤ zmin, there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with bundling pricing.
The outcome is identical to the equilibrium for strict complements, i.e., z=0, as products
A and B are always consumed as a bundle (A+B).
(b) If z ≥ zmax, there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with independent
pricing. Some consumers buy A alone while other consumers buy (A+B).
(c) If T(z) = 0 has only one solution, then no pure-strategy equilibrium exists over the entire
interval (zmin , zmax). If T(z)=0 has multiple solutions, then over (zmin , zmax), there exist
alternating sub-intervals such that over some intervals there exists a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium with independent pricing, and over the remaining intervals no pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium exists.
(d) When there is no pure-strategy equilibrium, we can construct a mixed-strategy
equilibrium. The mixed-strategy equilibrium is characterized by a quadruplet [α, p*A1 ,
13

The arguments can be generalized to any odd number of solutions.
Notice that monotonicity is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for uniqueness. This
condition is satisfied for uniform distribution F(θ).
14
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% B ), p% B ], where firm B sets its price at p% B , α is the probability of firm A’s
RA( p
%B ) .
adopting p*A1 , and (1- α) is the probability of firm A’s adopting RA( p
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 says that if z is small, then bundling pricing is a Nash Equilibrium. After z
increases beyond a certain point, firm A would rather set its price to sell product A alone without
consideration of product B. This independent pricing by firm A, however, cannot be part of a
pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium, if Firm B targets at roughly the same set of consumers. The
converse of this result is that independent pricing can be a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium only if
firm A’s market share is much larger than that of firm B.15 As an example, suppose that q=1, z=0.7,
cB = 0.1 and cA = 0. Independent pricing leads to θA = 0.5, and θB = 0.67, in which firm A’s
market share is much larger than that of firm B. These prices constitute a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium because firm A will lose customers rapidly if it raises its price above p*A1 . No
customers will continue to buy A as part of (A+B) if they decide not to buy A alone, unless the
price is raised all the way to the point at which θA becomes equal to θB.
The existence and non-existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium are illustrated in
Figures 5. If z > zmax, as illustrated in Figure 5-(a), in equilibrium the firms adopt independent
pricing; if z < zmin, as illustrated in Figure 5-(c), in equilibrium the firms adopt bundling pricing.
The nature of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 5-(b). If firm B sets its

% B ) and is therefore
price at p% B , as Lemma 2 shows, firm A is indifferent between p A1 and RA( p
*

indifferent between any randomization of them. There exist probabilities α for p*A1 and (1-α) for
RA( p% B ) such that firm B’s best response to firm A’s randomization is exactly p% B .
If there is only one type of consumer, firm A, by virtue of the fact that product A is
essential to the enjoyment of product B, could extract some of the additional value created by
product B via aggressive pricing, i.e., firm A sets a higher price for its product than in the absence

15

Under independent pricing, firm A’s market share (resp. firm B’s market share) depend on

(resp.

cB
q−z

). Thus, it happens when z is much larger than

qc A
c A + cB

cA
z

.
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of product B, taking out some values created by firm B.16 Proposition 1, however, raises questions
about the validity of this idea. Part (b) says that over some range of z there is no pure -strategy
Nash equilibrium. And when such an equilibrium exists, part (c) says that if the extent of the
quality enhancement, (q-z), is small, then product B does not affect firm A’s pricing and profits.

4.

The impact of z on firm profits, consumer surplus, and

social welfare
Quite often a dominant firm in one layer extends its product boundary to include
functions that are traditionally provided by its complementors. In this section, we analyse the
impact of z on the firms’ prices and profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare for the two
basic cases identified in Proposition 1 (namely, bundling pricing and independent pricing). In the
analysis, we assume that cA does not change with z, which is a good approximation for the
software industry.17 If cA is allowed to increase with z, our main comparative statics results in the
independent pricing case still hold so long as

z
cA ( z)

is increasing in z, i.e., the production cost per

unit of z is a decreasing function of z.18

Virtually strict complements under bundling pricing

16

When there is only a single consumer type, the existence of product B will lead to a higher

price for product A. As an example, suppose the consumer values product A at 100 and (A+B) at
110. Then any price (pA= x, pB =110-x) is a Nash equilibrium as long as 110≥ x ≥100. In Carlton
and Waldman (2002), for instance, the surplus created by the complementary good is assumed to
be equally divided between the entrant and the incumbent firm.
17

For instance, even though Microsoft expands the functions of Windows by incurring R&D

costs, the marginal production cost of a copy of the Windows would remain roughly the same as
before.
18

In the case of virtually strict complements, the results are different from those reported in

Proposition 2. See the next footnote
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If z is small, in equilibrium the firms adopt bundling pricing, and consumers buy only the
bundle (A+B). The firms’ equilibrium prices are identical to those when z = 0,19 and there is a
double mark-up problem. Thus, we have
Proposition 2: If z ∈ [0, zmin), then the equilibrium prices are the same as those for z = 0.
Consumers always buy A and B as a bundle, and the double mark-up problem persists. The
firms’ profits, consumer surplus and social welfare are independent of z.

Virtually independent products under independent pricing
Intuitively, one expects that more consumers buy A and fewer consumers buy B as A’s
own performance z improves. That is indeed the case when A and B are virtually independent, i.e.
z ≥ zmax.
Under independent pricing, firm A maximizes ΠA = F(θA)(pA-cA) = zF(θA)(θAchoosing θ A* . Firm A’s optimal cut-off point θ A* is an increasing function of

cA
z

cA
z

) by

, which implies

that as z increases more consumers buy product A. Similarly, firm B choose θ B* to maximize ΠB
c

= F(θB)(pB-cB) = (q-z)F(θB)(θB- q −Bz ). Firm B’s optimal cut-off θB* is an increasing function of
cB
1− z

, which implies that as z increases fewer consumers buy product B.
To better understand the classical double mark-up problem for the case of independent

pricing, we need to characterize the optimal pricing strategies of an integrated monopoly that sells
both products A and B. It maximizes ΠInt as defined in (5) by choosing two optimal cut-off points,
xA and xB, where types higher than xA buy product A, and types higher than xB buy product B
additionally. Since consumers will not buy B without buying A, the firm’s choice variables are
subject to the constraint xA ≤ xB.
ΠInt = F(xA)(pA-cA) + F(xB)(pB -cB)
= zF(xA)(xA-

19

cA
z

c

) + (q-z)F(xB)( xB - q −Bz )

(5)

Under bundled pricing, if cA increases in z, then z affects the firms’ prices only through cA.

Thus, the effects of increasing z are the same as those of increasing cA. That is, as z increases, p *A
goes up but p B* , social welfare as well as the two firms’ profits go down.
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Obviously, the profit function ΠInt is equal to the sum of ΠA and ΠB. In the absence of the
constraint xA ≤ xB, these two parts of (5) can be maximized independently.
If

cA
z

≤

cB
q− z

, or equivalently if z ≥

q cA
c A +cB

, then independent maximization leads to xB* ≥

xA* , i.e., the constraint is automatically satisfied, and the integrated firm can ignore the
constraint. In contrast, if

cA
z

c

> q −Bz , or equivalently if z <

qc A
c A + cB

, then the constraint becomes

binding, implying that the integrated firm will set xB*= xA* . That is, if z ≥

q cA
c A + cB

, the integrated

firm sells the two products as if the two products are independent of each other, and if z <

qc A
c A +cB

,

the firm sells the two products as if they are strict complements.
Since zmax>

q cA
c A +cB

, if z ≥ zmax, then the two firms A and B behave independently, and the

prices set by firms A and B are equal to those set by the integrated monopoly. That is, the double
mark-up problem disappears completely. Also, since the integrated firm’s profit increases in z, the
industry profits (the sum of the two firms’ profits) increase in z.
Let us investigate the effect of an increase in z on the consumer surplus. In the case of
virtually independent products, as z increases, θB increases but θA decreases. The latter implies
that some new consumers buy product A, which adds to total consumer surplus. The former
implies that some consumers switch from buying the bundle (A+B) to buying product A alone.
If θ is uniformly distributed, then in equilibrium the total price ( p *A1 + p B* 1 ) is

q + c A + cB
2

,

which does not change with z. Given that the price of the bundle is unaffected by z, by revealed
preference consumers who switch from the bundle to product A alone are better off, whereas
consumers who stay with the bundle are neither better off nor worse off. Thus, considering the
impact on new consumers who buy A alone, consumers who continue to buy the bundle, and
consumers who switch from the bundle to A alone, aggregate consumer surplus is definitely
larger when z increases.
Proposition 3: Suppose the products are virtually independent as firms adopt independent pricing
( z ≥ zmax). Then, when cA and cB are positive , as z increases:
(a) p *A1 increases and p B* 1 decreases;
(b) more consumers buy product A, and fewer consumers buy product B;
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(c) firm A’s profits increase, firm B’s profits decrease, and the industry profits (the sum of the
two firms’ profits) increase. Also, there is no double mark-up problem.
(d) When θ is uniformly distributed, the total consumer surplus as well as the industry profits
increase.
However, for a general distribution, G(θ), it is not clear how ( p *A1 + p B* 1 ) changes with z.
If the total price goes up, then those consumers who buy the bundle both before and after z
increases will lose. To ascertain such a possibility, let us consider the following example in which,
as z increases from some given value, not only the aggregate consumer surplus, but also social
welfare decline. Suppose the distribution function of θ is given by G(θ)= θ2, one that satisfies the
standard increasing hazard rate condition. Suppose further that q=1, cA=0.2 and cB=0.3. It can be
verified that zmin=0.41 and zmzx=0.45, so at z= 0.5 there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
under independent pricing. It can be shown that (i)

∂ ( p

+ p
∂z

A

B

)

> 0 and (ii)

∂SW
∂z

< 0 at z

=0.5. Since the industry profits increase with z for all z, the latter result implies that aggregate
consumer surplus must have decreased as z increases from z=0.5.

Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
In this section, we examine the properties of the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium

% B ), p% B ] for z between zmin and zmax.
identified in Proposition 1, [α, p*A1 , RA( p
% B firm A is indifferent between p*A1 and
From the definition of a mixed-strategy, given p

% B ), i.e., ΠA1( p*A1 ) = ΠA2 (RA( p% B )). From Proposition 3, we already know that p*A1 is an
RA( p
increasing function of z. Since firm A is indifferent between the two prices, its expected profit is
equal to ΠA1, which increases with z. Thus, firm A’s expected profit increases in z. Also, from the
definition of the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, when z increases, ΠA2 must also increase,

% B decreases. Since RA(pB) is a decreasing function of pB, its follows
which can occur only if p
that RA( ~
p B ) increases in z. Because as z increases, both p*A1 and RA( p% B ) increase, implying that
the expected price of product A is an increasing function of z. To sum up, we have
Proposition 4: In the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, as z increases, the expected price of
product A go up, the price of product B goes down, and firm A’s expected profits go up.
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The α in the mixed strategy is chosen so that firm B’s optimal price to the randomization

% B . Unfortunately, we are not able to show how firm B’s profit and α change with z
becomes p
generally.

5. Extensions to two dimensions of consumer heterogeneity
In the basic model studied in Sections 2-4, a consumer of type θ derives satisfaction zθ
from product A and qθ from (A+B), respectively, which implies that consumers’ preferences
toward these two products are perfectly correlated. As Figures 1 and 2 show, each firm’s
marginal consumer is uniquely determined either only by its own price or only by the sum of
prices. As a result, each firm sets its price as if the two products were either independent or strict
complements.20 Under these conditions, we show that firm A’s best response function is not
continuous when firm A’s optimal pricing scheme changes from bundling pricing to independent
pricing, and therefore for some intermediate values z there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
To check the robustness of the results obtained in the previous sections, we now consider
a more general demand specification. Suppose that consumers derive UA (θ, v) = v+ zθ from the
main product A and derive UA+B (θ, v) = v + qθ from the bundle (A+B). An interpretation is that
product A provides two functions, and product B enhances the quality of A’s second function
from z to q. To make this new preference genuinely different from that of the basic model, we
assume that consumer preferences vary along v as well as θ.21 In the remainder of this section,
we assume (θ, v) to be distributed over [0, 1] x [0, v ].22 The vertical axis measures v, the
consumers’ valuation of the first function of product A, and the horizontal axis measures θ as
before. A necessary condition for a consumer to buy product A alone is VA(θ, v) = UA (θ, v) - pA ≥
0. Similarly, a necessary condition for a consumer to buy (A+B) is VA+B (θ, v) = UA+B - pA - pB ≥ 0.

20

We would like to thank an anonymous referee for providing us with this insight and for making

several useful suggestions about the analysis of more general preferences.
21

If v is a constant for all consumers, then VA(θ) = zθ-(pA- v) and VA+B (θ) =qθ-(pA-v+pB), and the

analysis in Sections 2-4 applies to this new demand specification if pA is replaced by (pA-v). All of
the earlier results remain intact.
22

The distribution of v between [0, v ] can be interpreted as if the quality level of the first

function is v , and the consumers’ valuation of the quality is distributed over [0, 1].
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Finally, a necessary condition for a consumer to buy the bundle (A+B) rather than A alone is θ ≥
θB= pB/(q-z).

Demand functions for products A and B
For simplicity, we set q=1. As shown in Figures 6, the nature of the demand functions for
A and B depends on whether the critical value of the intersection of VA and VA+B occurs above,
below, or within [0, v ].23
z

If ( p A − 1− z p B ) > v , the situation is as depicted in Figure 6 (a).24 Consumers above VA+B
will buy the bundle (A+B). The demand for either product depends on the total price (pA+pB), so
the two firms behave as if the two products are strict complements. In this case the value of z
does not affect the firms’ pricing and profits.
z

If ( p A − 1− z pB ) < 0 , the situation is as depicted in Figure 6 (b).25 Consumers above VA
buy product A, and consumers to the right of θB buy the bundle (A+B). Demand for the two
products becomes independent: the demand for B (the dark area) depends only on pB, and the
demand for A (light area + dark area) depends on pA alone. Thus, in this case each product’s
demand depends only on its own price, and there is no double mark-up problem.
z

If v ≥ ( p A − 1− z p B ) ≥0, then the situation is as depicted in Figure 6 (c). Demand for B is
given by the dark area, whereas demand for A is given by both the light and dark areas. In this
case, the demand for product B is a function of (pA+pB) as well as pB, and the demand for product
A depends on (pA+pB) as well as pA. In Sections 2-4 where consumers differ only in θ, each firm’s
marginal consumer is uniquely determined by either its own price alone or by (pA+pB ) alone.
However, in the two-dimensional case, this simple dichotomy is lost, because each firm may have
a continuum of marginal consumers, which depends on both its own price and the total price.
Therefore, we refer to the situation depicted in Figure 6(c) as an intermediate case of “mixed
demand.”
23

The intersection of VA and VA+B occurs at (pB/(1-z), pA- 1−z z pB). Thus, depending on whether

(pA- 1−z z pB) is larger than or less than 0 and v , the intersection of VA and VA+B occurs above,
below, or within [0, v ].
24

The inequality implies that pA> v .

25

The inequality implies that

pA
z

< 1p−Bz . Also, since

pB
1− z

is less than 1, it implies that

pA
z

<1.
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Nash equilibrium under uniform distribution
Let us check the existence of Nash equilibrium numerically under the assumption that θ
and v are distributed independently and uniformly over [0, 1] x [0, v ].
In the previous one-dimensional case, firm A’s optimal price is discontinuous in pB when
firm A’s optimal pricing regime switches from independent pricing to bundling pricing. But in
the two-dimensional case, if v is large enough, then there are enough consumers who are willing
to buy product A alone. Thus, bundling pricing is not firm A’s optimal pricing scheme even for a
case in which z is low.
For instance, if v =1 and cA =cB=0, then for any price pB between zero and one,26
bundling pricing cannot be firm A’s optimal price for all values of z.: In this case, when z = 0,
firm A’s optimal price results in the mixed demand, and firm A’s optimal price is continuous in
pB. Also, when z= 0.7, if pB is high, firm A’s optimal price results in independent pricing, and if
pB gets lower, firm A switches to the mixed demand regime, and firm A’s optimal price is
continuous in pB when it switches from the independent pricing regime to the mixed demand
regime.27 As a result, firm A’s optimal price is continuous in pB, and a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium exists for all values of z.
However, if v is small enough, then firm A’s optimal pricing scheme would be bundling
pricing for some values of z, and there is discontinuity in firm A’s best response to pB when firm
A switches from bundled sales to the mixed demand. Thus, for some values of z, there is no purestrategy Nash equilibrium, which is similar to the results in Proposition 1. An example is z= 0.4,

v =0.12 and cA =cB=0. The intuition is as follows: If v = 0, then the two-dimensional case is
reduced to the one-dimensional model, where the non-existence of pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium has been established. If

v

is small, then there are not enough consumers who buy

product A alone. Thus, for a small value of z, bundling pricing becomes attractive to firm A. In
other words, small

v and z may combine to make firm A’s best response function discontinuous,

the root reason for the non-existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

Nash equilibrium when v and θ are positively correlated

26

If firm B sets its price above one, it cannot make any positive sales.
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Since in reality consumers with high v tend to have high θ, let us study two cases in
which θ and v are positively correlated.
(1)

If θ and v are linearly related, say, v = sθ, then, the two-dimensional model is structurally

identical to our basic model because VA (θ,v) = ~
z θ-pA and VA+B(θ,v) = q~ θ- pA -pB , where ~
z = z+s

~ = q+s. The results obtained from our basic model in Sections 2-4 apply directly to this
and q
case.
(2)

Suppose that v = sθ + ε, where ε is uniformly distributed between [0, ε ]. Then VA(θ,v)

=(z+s)θ-pA+ ε, and VA+B(θ,v)=(q+s) θ-pA-pB+ ε, or equivalently VA(θ) = ε+ ~
z θ-pA, and

z = z+s and q~ = q+s. It is equivalent to the two-dimensional case
VA+B(θ)=ε+ q~ θ-pA-pB , where ~
analysed above in this section, so we can apply our earlier results to obtain the following: If the
dispersion of consumer types as captured by ε is small, then we might not have a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium; if ε is large, then a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists.

6. Conclusions
A dominant firm in one layer of a multi-layered system often seeks to extend the
functions of its products to include functions that are traditionally covered by firms in other layers.
The definition of product boundaries changes continuously as a consequence of vertical
competition. In this paper ,we solve for the equilibrium prices and profits of firms A and B for
different boundary values z. We have found that if z is low, then the main product A and its
enhancer B are always sold as a bundle; if z is sufficiently high, then the two firms behave as if
the two products are independent of each other, and the double mark-up problem disappears; over
a certain range of intermediate values of z, no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
When the simple model is extended from one dimension to two dimensions of consumer
heterogeneity, the non-existence of pure-strategy equilibrium survives either if the variation in
consumer preferences along the basic function v is small, or if the consumers’ preferences along
both functions (as captured by v and θ) are sufficiently positively correlated.

27

Under the parameter values, if pB is higher than 0.294, firm A’s optimal pricing results in

independent pricing; if pB is lower than 0.294, firm A’s optimal pricing gives rise to the mixed
demand regime.
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Appendix
The appendix collects the proofs that were omitted from the text.
The increasing hazard rate condition yields strictly quasi-concave profit functions.
Consider a monopolist supplying a product of quality level z. Without any loss of
generality, assume that the marginal cost of the product is zero. Let p denote the price of the
product and θ denote the firm’s cutoff point i.e., the lowest consumer type buying the product.
By definition, θ = p/z. Since there is a one-to-one mapping between p and θ, the firm maximizes
zθF(θ) by choosing its optimal cutoff point θ. The first-order condition of profit maximization is
given by zF(θ)+zθf(θ) = 0. The second derivative of the profit function is 2zf(θ)+zθf’(θ), which
upon substitution of the first-order condition becomes 2zf(θ)-zF(θ)f’(θ)/f(θ).
The increasing hazard rate condition (i.e., -f/F is increasing) implies (f(θ))2-F(θ)(f’(θ))>0,
which in turn implies 2zf(θ)-zF(θ)f’(θ)/f(θ)<0 because f(θ)<0. That is to say, the profit function
is locally strictly concave in θ whenever its slope is zero, i.e., the function is strictly quasiconcave in θ.

Q.E.D

Proof of Lemma 1
p

Firm B maximizes ΠB1 = F( q −Bz )(pB-cB) subject to pB ≥
F(

p A + pB
q

) (pB-cB) subject to pB ≤

q− z
z

q− z
z

p A but maximizes ΠB2 =

p A . Under the increasing hazard rate condition, each of

these two functions is strictly quasi-concave in pB and has a single peak. Let p B* 1 and RB(pA)
denote the unconstrained optimal pB for the profit functions, ΠB1(pB) and ΠB2(pB), respectively.
The first-order conditions of these profit functions are as follows:
∂Π B 1
pB
∂pB = F( q − z ) +f(
∂Π B 2
∂pB = F(

p A + pB
q

pB
q−z

) +f(

) (pB-cB)
p A + pB
q

1
q− z

=0

) (pB-cB) 1q =0

The two first-order conditions evaluated at the kink pB =

pA +

F(

pA
z
pA
z

)

f( )

z=

z
cB
q−z

q −z
z

p A become

(A1)
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pA +

F(
f(

pA
z
pA
z

)

qz
z
=
cB,
) q−z q−z

(A2)

Since F(θ)/f(θ) is increasing in θ, the left-hand side of (A1) and (A2) is
monotonically increasing in pA. Thus, given q, z, and cB, there is a unique pA that solves (A1) or
(A2), respectively. Denote the unique pA satisfying equations (A1) and (A2) by p

A

and p A ,

respectively.
Since the right-hand side of (A1) is positive and f(θ)<0, we know that p
since

q −cB
z

>1 and F(

q −cB
z

A

>0. Also,

) = 0, we have p A < q-cB. Since f(θ) <0 and z < qqz− z , we have 0<

p A < p A < q-cB.
There are three cases:
Case1 (pA ≤ p ): When evaluated at pB =
A

f(θ)<0. Since
q −z
z

∂Π B 1
∂pB

q− z
z

∂Π B 1
∂pB

p A , we have

≥ 0 and

∂Π B 2
∂pB

> 0 because

≥ 0, p B* 1 that maximizes ΠB1 does not violate the constraint that p B ≥

p A . However, RB(pA) that maximizes ΠB2 violates the constraint that p B ≤

Because ΠB1(

q− z
z

q −z
z

pA .

p A ) = ΠB2( q −z z p A ), the overall profit function has a single peak at p B* 1 , and

firm B’s global optimum price is given by p B* 1 .

Case 2 ( p A ≤ pA): In this case, when evaluated at pB =

q− z
z

p A , we have

∂Π B 1
∂p B

<0 and ∂∂ΠpBB 2 ≤ 0.

An argument similar to that for Case 1 establishes that the global optimum price is given by
RB(pA).
Case 3 (pA <pA < p A ): In this case, when evaluated at pB =

q− z
z

so the global maximum is achieved at the kink, i.e., p B* =

q −z

When pA= p ,from the definition of p ,
A

=

q− z
z

A

∂Π B 1
∂pB

z

p A , we have

∂Π B 1
∂p B

<0 and

∂Π B 2
∂pB

>0,

pA .

= 0 and

∂Π B 2
∂pB

>0 at the kind point pB

p A . Thus, the kink is firm B’s optimal price. When pA= p A , from the definition of p A ,
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∂Π B 1
∂pB

< 0 and

∂Π B 2
∂pB

=0 at the kind point pB =

q− z
z

p A . Thus, the kink is firm B’s optimal price.

Therefore, firm B’s optimal price is continuous in pA.
Q. E. D
Proof of Lemma 2:
Firm A’s profit function is composed of the two underlying profit functions: ΠA1 =
F(

pA
z

)(pA-cA) and ΠA2 = F(

p A + pB
q

) (pA-cA). The kink of product A’s demand curve occurs at pA

= q −z z pB. Let p*A1 and RA(pB) be the unconstrained optimal prices corresponding to ΠA1 and ΠA2,
respectively.
Evaluating the two first-order conditions of ΠA1 and ΠA2, respectively, at the kink and
rearranging yields

pB +(q-z)

F ( qp−Bz )
f(

pB
q− z

)

=

q−z
cA
z

(A3)

p
q − z F ( q −Bz ) q − z
pB + q
=
cA
z
z
f ( qp−Bz )

(A4)

Since F(θ)/f(θ) is increasing in θ, the left-hand side of (A3) and (A4) is monotonically increasing
in pB. Thus, there exist unique p B and p B that solve (A3) and (A4), respectively. Since f(θ) is
negative and q>z, we have 0< p B < pB and there are three cases:
Case1 (pB ≤ p B ): When evaluated at the kink pA =

z
q−z

A1
pB, we have ∂Π
≥ 0 and
∂p A

implies that p*A1 that maximizes ΠA1 is equal to or larger than
maximizes ΠA2 does not violates the condition pA ≥

z
q−z

z
q−z

z
q−z

> 0. It

pB , while RA(pB) that

pB . Because ΠA1( q −z z pB) = ΠA2( q −z z pB),

firm A’s global optimum is given by the peak of ΠA2 at RA(pB). Also, since
RA(pB) is strictly larger than

∂Π A 2
∂p A

∂Π A 2
∂p A

> 0 at the kink,

pB, and we have θA> θB.
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Case 2 ( pB ≤ pB ) : Again evaluated at the kink,

∂Π A1
∂p A

∂Π A 2
∂p A

<0 and

≤ 0. An argument similar to

that for case 1 establishes that firm A’s globally optimal price is p *A1 . Also, since
kink, p *A1 is strictly less than

z
q−z

∂Π A1
∂p A

<0 at the

pB, and we have θA< θB.

Case 3 ( p B < pB < pB ): When evaluated at the kink, we have

∂Π A1
∂p A

<0 and

∂Π A 2
∂p A

>0, and the

overall profit function has two peaks, one at p *A1 and the other at RA(pB), where p *A1 < q −z z pB
<RA(pB). We need to compare ΠA1( p *A1 ; z) and ΠA2(RA(pB); pB) to ascertain firm A’s globally
optimal price. From case 2, firm A’s global optimization occurs at p *A1 when pB = pB , which
indicates ΠA1( p *A1 ; z) >ΠA2(RA(pB); pB ). From case 1 firm A’s global optimization occurs at
RA(pB) when pB = p B , which indicates ΠA2(RA(pB); p B ) > ΠA1( p *A1 ; z). Since ΠA2(RA(pB);pB) is
continuously decreasing in pB while ΠA1( p *A1 ;z) is independent of pB, there exists a unique p% B
strictly between p B and pB such that ΠA1( p *A1 ;z) = ΠA2(RA(pB); p% B ); for pB < p% B , ΠA1( p *A1 ;z) <
ΠA2(RA(pB); pB) ; for pB > p% B , ΠA1( p *A1 ;z) > ΠA2(RA(pB); pB).
Combining the above cases yields Lemma 2.

Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 1
From Corollary 1, we know that there are only two candidates for a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium, ( p *A1 , p B* 1 ) and ( p *A 2 , p B* 2 ). Without any loss of generality, let us set q =1 in this
proof.
(A). Conditions under which ( p *A 2 , p B* 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium:
Suppose that the two firms set their prices at p *A 2 and p B* 2 , respectively. Then, a
necessary condition for these prices to be a Nash equilibrium is that the two firms face demand
system (2), or we have to have θB < θA, or equivalently z <

p*A 2
*
p A 2 + p*B 2

firms have any incentive to deviate from the prices when z <

. Let us check whether the

p*A 2
p*A 2 + p*B 2

.

First, when firm A sets its price at p *A 2 , firm B maximizes ΠB1(pB; z) if pB ≥
ΠB2(pB; pA) if pB ≤

1− z
z

1− z
z

p*A 2 and

p*A2 . As Lemma 1 shows, firm B’s overall profit function has only one
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peak. Thus, if p B* 2 maximizes ΠB2 without violating the constraint pB ≤
B’s globally optimal price. .When z <

p*A 2
p*A 2 + p*B 2

, we have

p*B 2
1− z

<

p*A 2
z

1− z
z

p*A2 , then it is firm

. Thus, p B* 2 maximizes ΠB2

without violating the constraint and, thus, is firm B’s globally optimal price when pA = p *A 2 .
Second, given p B* 2 , firm A maximizes ΠA1= F(
F(pA + p B* 2 )(pA-cA) if pA >

z
1− z

pA
z

)(pA-cA) if pA ≤

z
1− z

p B* 2 and ΠA2=

p B* 2 . Let S1* (z) and S2* denote the maximized value of the

respective profit functions given the constraints. Since z <

p*A 2
p*A 2 + p*B 2

, S2* is equal to Π*A2=

F( p *A 2 + p B* 2 )( p *A 2 -cA), which does not depends on z. Let S(z) be defined as S(z)= S1* (z)- S2* ,
which is continuous and monotonically increasing in z. Let us check the sign of S(z).
If z is smaller than cA, S(z) <0 because S1* (z) is zero.
Let us check the sign of S(

p*A 2
p*A 2 + p*B 2

). When z =

p*A 2
p*A 2 + p*B 2

, we have p *A 2 = 1−z z p B* 2 . Thus, ΠA2
∂Π A 2

is optimized at the kink point, pA= 1−z z pB* 2 . As Lemma 2 implies, when we have ∂p A
∂Π A1

kink point, we have ∂p A <0 at the kink point. Thus, S(

p*A 2
*
p A 2 + p*B 2

= 0 at the

) >0.

Since S(z) is continuous and monotonically increasing in z, there exists a unique zmin such
that S(zmin) =0. Also, since S(

p*A 2
*
p A 2 + p*B 2

)>0, we have zmin <

p*A 2
*
p A 2 + p*B 2

, which implies that θB < θA for z

≤ zmin. In summary, for z ≤ zmin the two firms do not deviate from ( p *A 2 and p B* 2 ), and these
prices constitute a Nash equilibrium.
(B). Conditions under which ( p *A1 , p B* 1 ) is a Nash equilibrium:
Suppose the two firms set their prices at p *A1 and p B* 1 , respectively. Then, a necessary
condition for these prices to be a Nash equilibrium is that the two firms face demand system (1).
That is, under the prices we have to have θB > θA, or equivalently
depends only on

cA
z

(resp.

cB
1− z

), we have

p*B 1
1− z

>

p*A1
z

p*B 1
1− z

if and only if z >

the firms have any incentive to deviate from ( p *A1 , p B* 1 ) when z >
p*B 1
1− z

>

p*A1
z

>

p*A1
z

cA
c A + cB
cA
c A + cB

. Since

p*A1
z

(resp.

p*B 1
1− z

)

. Let us check whether
or equivalently when

.
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First, firm B maximizes ΠB1(pB; z) if pB ≥

1− z
z

p*A1 and ΠB2(pB; pA) if pB ≤

Lemma 1 shows, firm B’s overall profit function has only one peak. When z >
p*B 1
1− z

>

p*A1
z

1− z
z

cA
c A + cB

p*A1 . As

, we have

, and pB* 1 maximizes ΠB1 without violating the constraint. Thus, firm B’s global peak

occurs at pB* 1 , and firm B would not deviate from pB* 1 if pA = p *A1 .
Second, let us check whether p *A1 is firm A’s optimal price, given pB* 1 . Firm A
maximizes ΠA1 = F(

pA
z

)(pA-cA) if pA ≤

z
1− z

p B* 1 and ΠA2 = F(pA+ p B* 1 ) (pA-cA) if pA ≥ 1−z z p B* 1 .

Let T1* (z) and T2* (z) denote the maximized values of the respective profit functions given the
constraints. Similar to part (A), let T(z) be defined as T(z)= T1* (z)- T2* (z). Since

p*B 1
1− z

>

p*A1
z

, T1* (z)

is equal to Π*A1, which is increasing in z. Since p B* 1 is decreasing in z, T2* (z) is a function of z,
too. Since both functions are continuous in z, so is T(z).
p*A1
z

c

If z= cA +AcB , then we have
to Lemma 2, when

∂Π A1
∂p A

=

p*B 1
1− z

, and ΠA1 is optimized at the kink

=0 at the kink point, we have

∂Π A 2
∂p A

z
1− z

p B* 1 . According

>0 at the kink point. Thus, given p B* 1 ,

firm A’s optimal price is RA( p B* 1 ), which implies that when z =

cA
c A + cB

we have T(z)<0 and that

firm A wants to deviate from p *A1 .
To establish the sign of T(z) at z = 1-cB, we check the first-order condition of ΠA2 when
evaluated at the kink pA = 1−z z p B* 1 . The first-order condition at the kink is
∂Π A 2
∂p A

=F( θ B*1 )+f( θ B*1 )(z θ B*1 -cＡ), which when combined with the first-order condition of ΠB1

evaluated at p B* 1 , becomes –f( θ B*1 )((1-z) θ B*1 + cA - 1−Bz ). Since f(θ)<0, the sign of the expression
c

is equal to that of ((1-z) θ B*1 +cA - 1−Bz ), which is monotonically decreasing in z. When z = (1-cB),
c

the sign of the expression is equal to that of [cBθB +cA-1 ], which is negative because cB +cA<1 and
θB<1. As Lemma 2 shows, when

∂Π A 2
∂p A

<0 at the kink, firm A’s global optimal price is given by

p *A1 . Thus, when z = 1-cB, we have T(z) >0 and firm A does not want to deviate from p *A1 .
c

Since T( cA +AcB ) < 0 , T(1-cB) >0 and T(z) is continuous in z, there exists at least one
c

solution to T(z) = 0. Since T( cA +AcB ) < 0, the solutions to T(z)=0 are larger than

cA
c A + cB

. If T(z) has
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multiple solutions, let zmax denote the largest solution. By definition T(z) > 0 for all z > zmax,
implying that firm A would not switch from independent pricing to bundling pricing if z > zmax.
In summary, since zmax >

cA
c A + cB

, if z ≥ zmax, then we have θB >θA, and the two firms would

not deviate from ( p *A1 , p B* 1 ). That is, these prices constitute a Nash equilibrium.

(C). zmin< zmax
From the first-order conditions of p *A 2 and p B* 2 , we have
*

p*A 2
p*A 2 + p*B 2

=

*

cA − Ff (( pp*A 2 ++ pp*B 2 ))
A2

c A + cB − 2

shown that zmin <

B2
F ( p*A 2 + p*B 2 )
f ( p*A 2 + p*B 2 )

p*A 2
*
p A 2 + p*B 2

inequalities yields zmin<

. Since f(θ)<0, we obtain

p*A 2
*
p A 2 + p*B 2

c

< c A +AcB . But we have already

and that all solutions to T(z)=0 are larger than
cA
c A + cB

cA
c A + cB

. Combining the

< zmax.

If the solution of T(z) = 0 is unique, then it is equal to zmax, and for all z between zmin and
zmax, T(z)<0, which indicates that there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for those values of z.
However, if there are multiple solutions, since T(z) <0 for small z and T(z) >0 for large z,
T(z) = 0 has an odd number of solutions, and there are alternating sub-intervals over which T(z) >
0 and sub-intervals over which T(z)<0. If zmin< z and T(z) >0, then independent pricing is Nash
equilibrium for the values of z. If zmin< z and T(z) <0, then there is no pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium for the values of z. Nevertheless, a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium can be
constructed.

(D). Mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium:
The firms’ best response curves as depicted below help to demonstrate the construction

p B such that firm A
of the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Suppose that firm B sets its price at ~
has two optimal prices and is indifferent between p *A1 and RA( ~
p B ). Suppose that firm A sets its
price at p *A1 with probability α and at RA( ~
p B ) with probability (1-α). Let us analyse whether
firm B’s best response to this mixed strategy would indeed be ~
pB .
The existence and characteristics of the Nash equilibrium depend on where the two points,
m and n, in Figure A(1) are located in Figure A(2). Let y1 and y2 denote firm B’s best response to
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p *A1 and RA( ~
p B ), respectively. Since

> RB' , when there is no pure-strategy Nash

1
RA'

p B <y2.
equilibrium, point n in Figure 7-(a) must be in area B in Figure 7-(b). It indicates that ~

% B , then firm A’s best response to y1 is p *A1 , and ( p *A1 , y1)
If y1 is higher than or equal to p
becomes a pure-strategy equilibrium, which contradicts the non-existence of such an equilibrium.
Thus, point m must be in area C, which indicates that we have y1 < ~
pB .

p B ), we can show that in terms of
Regardless of whether firm A sets its price pA1 or RA( ~
firm B’s profit any pB higher than y2 is dominated by y2 and that any pB lower than y1 is dominated
by y1. Thus, firm B’s optimal price to firm A’s randomization is strictly in between y1 and y2.
When point n is in area B and point m is in area C, if firm B sets its price pB strictly in
between y1 and y2, we have

q− z
z

pA1 < pB<

q− z
z

RA ( ~
p B ), implying that firm B’s profit function is

given by
p

ΠB(pB) = α F( q −Bz )(pB-cB) +(1-α)F(

RA ( p% B ) + pB
q

) (pB-cB)

p B is
If α=0, firm B’s optimal price is y2; if α=1, firm B’s optimal price is y1. Since ~
between y1 and y2 and firm B’s optimal price is continuous in α, by the mean value theorem there

p B . This proves that [α, pA1,, pA2, p% B ]
exists α such that firm B’s optimal price is equal to ~
constitute a mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium.

Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 3
Part (a):
Firm A’s optimal price satisfies the following first-order condition:

p *A = cA - z
Since (-

F (θ A )
f(θ A )

F (θ A )
) is decreasing in θA and θA is decreasing in z, the right-hand side of the above
f(θ A )

condition is increasing in z, i.e., p *A1 (z) is increasing in z for all z ≥ zmax.
Firm B’s optimal price satisfies the following first-order condition:

p B* = cB - ( q − z )

F (θ B )
f(θ B )
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Since (-

F (θ B )
) is decreasing in θB and θB is increasing in z, the right-hand side of the above
f(θ B )

condition is decreasing in z. Thus, p B* 1 (z) decreases in z for all z ≥ zmax
Part (b) follows from changes in θ A and θ B* .
*

Part (c) :
As firm A maximizes zF(θA)(θA-

cA
z

), its profit clearly increases in z for z> zmax. As firm B

c

maximizes (q-z)F(θB)(θB- q −Bz ), its profit deceases in z for z > zmax.
If z > zmax, the two parts of the industry profits are independent of each other, and by the
envelope theorem, we obtain
maximizes F(xA)(xA -

cA
z

∂ (Π A +Π B )
∂z

= F(xA*)( xA*) - F(xB*)( xB*). Please note that xA*
c

), and xB* maximizes F(xB)(xB - q −Bz ). (Note that F(x)(x) is revenue for

a firm maximizing F(x)(x-c)). As a firm’s marginal cost gets lower, its revenue gets higher. That
is, if

cA
z

c

< q −Bz , or equivalently if z>

qc A
c A +cB

, then F(xA*)( xA*) > F(xB*)( xB*). Thus,

∂ (Π A +Π B )
∂z

> 0.

Q. E. D
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pB
pB =
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z
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pB =RB(pA)
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PA
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Figure 3. Firm B’s best response to pA if θ is uniformly distributed

Jae Nahm, Figure 3 of 7.
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T(z)

0
zmin
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zmax

Figure 4. The sign of T(z) when T(z)=0 has multiple solutions

Jae Nahm, Figure 4 of 7.
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Figure 5-(a), z ≥zmax
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Figure 5-(b) zmin < z < zmax

Figure 5-(c), z ≤ zmin

Figure 5 (a), (b), and (c), Nash equilibrium when θ is uniformly distributed
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pB

pB

m =( p*A1 , p% B ),

C

n =( RA( ~
p B ) p% B ).

p% B

RA(pB)

p*A1

RA( ~
pB )

A

pA

Figure A (1). Firm A’s best response curve

D

RB(pA)

B

pA

Figure A (2). Firm B’s best response

Jae Nahm, Figure 7 of 7.
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